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Abstract
Background: Obtaining informed consent from patients is a moral and legal duty and, thus, a key legitimation for
medical treatment. The pivotal prerequisite for valid informed consent is decision-making capacity of the patient.
Related to the question of whether and when consent should be morally and legally valid, there has been a long-
lasting philosophical debate about freedom of will and the connection of freedom and responsibility.
Main text: The scholarly discussion on decision-making capacity and its clinical evaluation does not sufficiently take
into account this fundamental debate. It is contended that the notion of free will must be reflected when evaluating
decision-making capacity. Namely, it should be included as a part of the appreciation-criterion for decision-making
capacity. The argumentation is mainly drawn on the compatibilism of Harry Frankfurt.
Conclusions: A solution is proposed which at the same time takes the notion of free will seriously and enriches the
traditional understanding of decision-making capacity, strengthening its justificatory force while remaining clinically
applicable.
Keywords: Informed consent, Decision-making capacity, Competence, Ethics, Free will, Autonomy, Authenticity,
Compatibilism, Harry Frankfurt
Background
Informed consent is central to the legitimation of medical
treatments. Obtaining the patient’s informed consent is
not only a legal prerequisite. Beyond that, it is considered
a moral duty because it reflects the healthcare profes-
sionals’ respect for personal autonomy and the individual’s
right to self-determination [1–5]. “[In] the late1950s […]
medicine became self-aware and self-critical about its pa-
ternalistic ways and began to take the rights of the patient
seriously: patients, it was determined, should be truthfully
informed about their diagnosis and the nature of available
treatments (including harms and risks)” ([6] p. 23). How-
ever, why has respect for autonomy become such central
moral principle? A common way to comprehend this, is
that autonomy can be conceived as axiomatically valuable
[7]. However, this cannot be the only reason, because au-
tonomy has not been an important moral principle in
other times and cultures including eras that were not
dominated by medical paternalism. Another reason for
the increased importance of respect for autonomy in
medicine could be that respecting patients’ autonomy
fosters favorable treatment outcomes. In addition to axi-
omatically setting the importance of autonomy, we can
therefore bring in a second argument based on a very gen-
eral duty to provide good therapy. This argument states in
the first normative premise that (1) in medicine, good
therapy is essential. The second empirical premise is that
(2) respect for autonomy promotes good therapy - and
vice versa: disregarding autonomy is detrimental to good
therapy (ceteris paribus). From this, we can now conclude
that respect for autonomy is an obligation/objective.
We consider the first premise, in this general formula-
tion, to be indisputable. The second premise is more de-
manding. Although it has to be still empirically shown if
and to what extent autonomy instantiated in informed
consent fosters well-being, we have numerous indica-
tions for this assumption: Appropriate informed consent
procedures are important for augmenting mutual trust,
and so provide the basis for a good and stable alliance
between patient and health care professional. For ex-
ample, in the case of psychiatric treatments, it has been
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shown that a strong therapeutic relationship is among
the most important factors for a successful treatment
outcome (e.g., [8–10]. According to Beahrs and Gutheil
([11] p. 6),
[…] the duty to provide informed consent fosters
shifts from indoctrination to information sharing and
from paternalism to respect of patients’ autonomy. In
so doing, we help to access, validate, empower, and
challenge our patients’ own natural strengths so that
they can use these strengths toward more effective
self-help, the sine qua non of a positive treatment
outcome.
Informed consent further requires that health care
professionals explain diagnostic findings and provide in-
formation about the illness/disorder itself, as well as rea-
sons for and characteristics of the proposed treatment,
such as aims, benefits, expected course, and expected
duration [11]. In addition, information about alternative
therapy options, potential risks, side-effects, and conse-
quences of refusal should be disclosed to the patient
[12–14].
Just as respect for autonomy is expressed in the duty
to get informed consent, so informed consent presup-
poses the patient’s decision-making capacity (DMC).
Therefore, DMC is seen as the key element for informed
consent in medicine [15]. On this clinical level, this does
not cause any fundamental problems. However, prob-
lems arise on a more conceptual level and will be dis-
cussed in the following.
In the present contribution, it is our aim to introduce
a philosophically crucial element for the justification of
actions into the debate on autonomy, informed consent,
and DMC: the notion of free will. We have argued above
that respect for autonomy is crucial. Now we can build
another argument on the conclusion of this argument
(or on the establishment of an axiomatic value of auton-
omy): Here we state (1) that the duty to respect auton-
omy requires that this value be implemented in clinical
instruments (such as DMC). We claim that (2) DMC
considers aspects of autonomy that are necessary but
not sufficient. With assumption (3) that free will com-
pletes the DMC criteria, we can conclude that free will
is a prerequisite for a justified responsible decision in
practice.
Main text
Free will is largely considered as a necessary condition
for moral responsibility. O’Connor and Franklin note
(with many references to literature) that “the kind of
control or sense of up-to-meness involved in free will is
the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness relevant to
moral responsibility” [16]. We will see later that it is
controversial what conditions must be met in order to
assume control which is sufficient for free will. In par-
ticular, it is controversial whether this should include
the ability to choose otherwise, which would be made
impossible by the truth of determinism. A minority of
thinkers in the free will debate denies that control is suf-
ficient for free will, but nevertheless assumes that this
control is necessary to be morally responsible [17]. We
will argue later that it makes sense to understand free
will independently of the question of determinism.
Therefore, we stand for the view that a (yet to be ex-
plained) form of control is sufficient for free will, which
in turn is a necessary condition for responsibility.
Although they share common ground, the debates of
DMC and free will have been usually taken place separ-
ately. This may be because of prejudices by one part of
scholars judging the classical free will debate detached
from the real world, or by the other part of scholars dis-
missing all pragmatic accounts to be theoretically un-
founded. We are convinced that both views are wrong.
We believe these lines of thoughts to be closely related
and providing the potential for mutual understanding.
The connection, envisaged in this paper, should, on the
one hand, meet the theoretical profoundness of the
philosophical debate on free will, and on the other hand,
be applicable in clinical practice when it comes to the
evaluation of DMC. Another misunderstanding that we
must clear up is the following: It does not follow from
the practical necessity of an instrument (such as DMC)
that this instrument legitimizes itself. Nor do legal
claims (as they are formulated in many ways in the case
of respect for autonomy) legitimize themselves. Even for
philosophers of law who advocate a conceptual separ-
ation of law and ethics, it is by no means impossible to
question the ethical legitimation of law. Accordingly, for
example Leslie Green, one of the most important con-
temporary legal philosophers (and legal positivists),
states that “no legal philosopher can be only a legal posi-
tivist” [18]. What applies to legal norms applies a fortiori
to instruments which are not themselves legal norms, to
which soft law belongs or which standardize professional
duties. With this assumption we oppose a doctrine that
can be described as ethical nihilism in the philosophy of
law. With regard to DMC as an instrument of clinical
practice, we are convinced that it is only justified mor-
ally if freedom of will is not excluded. In the first part of
the present contribution, we present an overview of the
classical understanding of DMC as well as of the philo-
sophical approaches to free will. In the second part, we
further examine positions on free will, argue for compa-
tibilism introducing the theory of Harry Frankfurt and
defend it against recently raised criticism. In the third
part, we take a closer look at various types of inner and
outer constraints and their implication for the
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assessment of patient’s appreciation as one important
criterion for DMC. In the conclusion section, we inte-
grate our findings.
Classical criteria for decision-making capacity
The following criteria for DMC are widely accepted [19]:
(a) the ability to understand the relevant information.
Understanding consists of the ability to comprehend
treatment-related information concerning the present dis-
order, treatment options, and the related risks and benefits
[19]. (b) the ability to appreciate the disorder and the
medical consequences of the situation. Appreciation refers
to the ability to acknowledge the nature of the disorder
and the possibility that treatment may be beneficial. This
differs from the understanding standard in that it requires
the patient to apply the information abstractly to his or
her own situation [19]. It takes into account that one and
the same diagnosis or therapy differ in the way they affect
two persons in their different living conditions and
attitudes towards life. (c) the ability to reason about treat-
ment choices. Reasoning requires a certain consistency of
beliefs and the ability to derive conclusions from premises
(although there are conceptions which go much further
by requiring true beliefs as premises; see [3]. (d) the ability
to communicate a choice.
Many mental and physical disorders can impact sig-
nificantly on DMC [20–23]. “Decision-making incapacity
is associated with a broad range of clinical conditions
that include various forms of dementia, delirium, organic
amnestic syndromes, brain injury, and disorders of con-
sciousness such as coma, vegetative and minimally con-
scious states, as well as psychiatric diseases such as
schizophrenia or severe depression, or medically- or
illness-induced impaired consciousness in critically
unstable patients who are too ill to participate in
decision-making” ([5], p. 360).
DMC can change with the fluctuation of symptoms, as
well as over time and across different situations [5, 20].
For example, a person may be deemed to have DMC for
matters of everyday life (e.g., what to eat) but may not
be sufficiently capable of making decisions regarding
medical treatment (referred to as decisional relativity by
Buchanan and Brock [24]. Because DMC is thus deci-
sional relative and furthermore not time-invariant, its
validity is related to the date of the evaluation [13]. Not
the criteria for DMC are variable, but the difficulty of
patients to meet them dependent on their clinical condi-
tion (in this regard, we shall see later an accordance with
free will). For instance, both, the determination on
which finger a drop of blood has to be taken, and the
decision on a chemotherapy, must be sufficiently under-
stood, appreciated, reasoned and communicated.
Neglecting the simple cases is not due to ignorance with
regard to the justifying conditions but to the compara-
tively harmless consequences.
Free will: why we need a compatibilist understanding
The fundamental importance of free will for the legit-
imation of any treatment decision by a patient is widely
acknowledged (e.g., [25]). To get a basic understanding
of what freedom of will is, consider the following cases:
First, think of a prisoner who is almost entirely unable
to do what she wants. Nevertheless, in her imagination
she contemplates different scenarios, and, by virtue of
this, has many desires. Now, compare the prisoner with
a billionaire, who, with huge financial resources, could
put a large part of his wishes into effect. However, the
billionaire is suffering from an episode of acute mania
that interferes with his ability to resist any of his im-
pulses to buy sailing yachts. While the prisoner lacks
freedom of action – while her will is not necessarily un-
free because of the fact of being incarcerated – the bil-
lionaire lacks free will. A person can enjoy freedom of
action yet still not wanting something freely (and vice
versa). Both persons in these cases lack full autonomy
(either because of an outer constraint, as the prison, or
of an inner constraint, as the mania).
What exactly is freedom of the will? Why is it that a
mania destroys it? The ability to form a will freely, i.e. to
be the author or owner of one’s will means to experience
a certain degree of control. Indeed, freedom of will (in
the Western debate) has always been related to the con-
cept of control [16]. In the free will debate, there are
two principal opposing positions, which differ in terms
of the consequences the notion of determinism would
have for freedom (see e.g., [26–28]). Determinism is the
thesis that certain conditions entail the occurrence of
every present and future event (as in fatum, god’s fore-
seeing, or most importantly, the laws of physics plus
events in the past). We do not consider here any ideas
which presuppose the existence of a personal destiny or
God, and therefore limit ourselves to a determinism
based on natural law [29]. Compatibilism holds that we
can be free despite or, according to some versions, pre-
cisely because of the truth of determinism [31, 32], for
an overview see [30]. Conversely, incompatibilism denies
that determinism and free will can both be true. Among
incompatibilists, the libertarians argue that free will is
possible and determinism is false while the hard incom-
patibilists (or hard determinists) assert that free will is
impossible because determinism is true [33].
We contend that a compatibilist framework is most
convincing. The compatibilist theory which we defend
does not make any metaphysical assumptions, i.e. it is ir-
relevant as to whether determinism is true or false. This
refers to many variations of compatibilism, but – by def-
inition – of no incompatibilist theory. Accordingly, the
theories which are neutral with regard to the truth of
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determinism are more probably right and applicable
because also a libertarian must – in addition to showing
the truth of indeterminism – argue under what
circumstances a person can be reasonably connected to
her (allegedly) own will (see also [23]).
One could ask oneself whether the problems that arise
around the truth or untruth of determinism are not of a
purely theoretical nature. Could it be that this dispute
represents an exclusively metaphysical problem that is
meaningless to medical ethics? We think that there is a
big misunderstanding because it either reveals a false
understanding of metaphysics (and thus a false under-
standing of what philosophy does) or a false understand-
ing of the difference between the premises of hard
incompatibilism and compatibilism. Freedom of the will
is by no means a “purely” metaphysical notion. Strictly
speaking, the concept of free will implies metaphysical
questions, but it is not limited to them. It is a highly
practical term. It is not at all unusual that key concepts
of our practical life are influenced by metaphysical
assumptions. Consider for example the concepts of
“knowledge” and “justice”: Both are terms with high rele-
vance to our practical life and both are influenced by
metaphysical assumptions. For example, our thoughts
on these terms may be influenced by whether we assume
that the world is intelligible at all (whether there are fun-
damental sensory data or pure reason etc.) or whether
or not there is absolute justice (owing to the existence of
God or moral realism etc.). No matter how we face up
to these assumptions, we position ourselves.
On this background, we have a burden-of-proof argu-
ment for compatibilism: It is an undecided problem
whether determinism is true or false [34]. Balaguer notes
that neither the “Copenhagen Model” nor Bell’s theorem,
nor a multiverse theory, can clearly prove that indeter-
minism is right or wrong. Therefore, it is the case that
there are “no good arguments for or against determin-
ism” [34]. Moreover, it remains controversial whether in-
determinism at a quantum physical level holds in a way
that could relevantly affect a person’s deliberations and
decisions [35]. However, even if we would follow an in-
terpretation of quantum physics according to which in-
determinism is true there would remain two problems:
First, it would be to clarify if and how quantum indeter-
minism affects neurological and (or) our deliberational
process. Second, and more important, the task of assign-
ing the will to a person must (nevertheless) be spelled
out. A certain act of will must belong to the very person
who expresses it, in such a way that the will is related to
that person. This is a common task for both, libertarian-
ism and compatibilism [16]. This requirement, which
has to be assessed in every individual case, can be
expressed namely as non-randomness of one’s will [34].
So, pragmatically, and unaffected by the problem of
determinism, we should concentrate on the hardly un-
contested part of the free will debate, which consists –
as we have stated above – in the widely shared assump-
tion that a certain kind of control over one’s actions is
necessary for free will. Indeed, physicians who are in-
clined to be indifferent regarding determinism [36, 37]
have grasped that they should focus on patients control
over their will. Here, we present the arguments that sup-
port clinical practice, and we argue that hard incompati-
bilism and libertarianism may play a significant role in
the general free will debate, but that they are of negli-
gible significance for the discussion of DMC and thereby
informed consent.
Frankfurt’s theory of free will
We contend that Harry Frankfurt’s famous compatibilist
theory is both, theoretically well founded and applicable
in practice. Frankfurt proposed a theory that simply as-
sumes us to be free when “what we want is what we
want to want” [38]; for the latest discussion of Frank-
furt’s conception see [30]. Frankfurt draws distinctions
between different types of desires. First-order-desires are
those related to actions (e.g., a desire to wash my hands);
second-order-desires are desires related to desires (e.g., a
desire to have the desire to wash my hands). Free will
consists of what Frankfurt described as a “certain vol-
itional unanimity” ([38] p. 15). If a person succeeds in
making a second-order-desire effective, then he or she
enjoys free will. In this case, an action motivating
first-order desire is exactly the desire by which we want
our action to be motivated [38], in which case there is
no substantial “inner” conflict of any sort.
The above-mentioned examples clearly show the simi-
larities between the classical DMC criteria and Frank-
furt’s understanding of free will: Persons enjoy free will
when they are able to evaluate their desires by withhold-
ing some of them and identifying one that seems the
best choice “overall”. Accordingly, with respect to DMC,
these persons understand the relevant information and
can appreciate what is at stake. Frankfurt coined the
term “wholeheartedness” to describe the state in which a
person comprehends his or her motives to be in har-
mony with each other and where no motivating desires
are imposed against that person’s will ([39] p. 165).
Reaching this harmony doesn’t mean that individuals –
if they want freely – eliminate all their weaker
second-order-desires. The required reflection capability
only ensures that they pick out the crucial desire in the
light of their own picture of themselves or their deter-
mining aims in life. Frankfurt claims that practical rea-
soning is conceptually connected to goals and to what
we fundamentally care for [38]. In his more recent writ-
ings, Frankfurt emphasizes more strongly that desires
relevant to freedom must express what the person is at
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heart [38]. In this regard, his position qualifies as a
“self-expression theory” which must be differentiated
from “control-based theories” (for a good overview see
[40]). For a self-expression theory, it is essential that it
assumes the existence of a set of properties that are con-
stitutive for the person’s deep self. As Sripada notes, the
self is the “cluster of attitudes that specify what matters
most to her and what is for her most worth pursuing”
([40] p. 785). Frankfurt defines them as the source of
our practical reasons [38]. What we care about defines
what goals we have and this differs from what we ordin-
arily desire in so far as goals reflect these desires with
which we identify. Persons do not simply have desires
but are able to make up their minds to reflect on desires,
to identify with a specific desire, and to withhold asser-
tion to others. [38].
It is conceivable that a person has two or even more
rivaling second-order-desires. That is simply what it
means to decide in uncertainty or dealing with ambiva-
lence. What is important is that considerations of these
desires come to an end after a while, by identifying the
strongest of these desires (in the next section we will
discuss a related objection).
Frankfurt’s theory has not stayed undisputed. In the
following section we will discuss and rebut four objec-
tions that we consider particularly relevant for the focus
of our argumentation: the first relates to the relevance of
the causal explanation of desires, the second objection
concerns the question of whether reflection can come to
an end in time, the third objection concerns whether the
requirements for reflection meet our usual understand-
ing of well-considered and (therefore) free decisions, and
the fourth objection criticizes Frankfurt’s approach on
the grounds that it is “impractical”.
Four objections to the Frankfurtian approach and their
rebuttal
Are we free, when we – after reflection – accept a desire
that is actually caused by a second-order desire?
Wouldn’t this be then a sort of illusion of rationality or
pseudo-reflection? Consider the following example: I
want to eat an ice cream cone and I think of myself as a
person who should be allowed to eat one ice cream cone
once a week, and therefore fully endorse this actual
(first-order) desire. Let us assume that I didn’t eat any
ice cream for 1 week and I’m going to have one cone
right now. But, from a third-person perspective, we
would know that this reflective endorsement actually re-
sulted from bodily processes (urge for sugar, hunger,
positive emotions when eating ice cream during child-
hood among others) and is therefore nothing more than
a kind of by-product. We can counter this as follows:
Remember that a second-order desire is defined as a de-
sire about a desire and not about an action. As such, it
is necessarily a reflective process as it involves a certain
self-distance to what is going on in one’s own mind.
From a compatibilist point of view, the causation of a
desire – by experience, by biological urge, or any other
way – does not destroy freedom. We would only come
to this conclusion if we hold an incompatibilist stand-
point. But as Frankfurt states: “Insofar as we are
governed by causal forces, we are not omnipotent. That
has no bearing, however, upon whether we can be free”
([38] p. 178). Presumably, it is just as much a (disguised)
paternalistic intuition as a fear from determinism, what
may lead to judge a person as unfree, when the causal
history of a desire seems to be (too) transparent. In fact,
we may be inclined to deny someone’s freedom, when
the almost obvious “mechanical apparatus” is visible, all
the more if it involves any self-damaging actions, as in
the case of drug use. In his famous example of the
willing addict, Frankfurt illustrates a man, who willfully
(by second-order reflection) wants to have the desire
(first-order) to take drugs although it would not be pos-
sible at all to have the desire to give up the drug because
of the physical dependence [38]. In other words,
although the renunciation of drugs is not really possible
for X, i.e. he does not control the desire, he has never-
theless fully embraced it. In contrast to the unwilling
addict, he is therefore responsible for his desire to take
the drug and his corresponding actions (for a strong
defense of self-express theories against control-based
theories see [40].
The willing addict is not that unrealistic as for in-
stance, socially well integrated cocaine addicts could
have a harmonious wish to take the drug if the
first-order wish to consume cocaine is compatible with
their overall life-plan. In the case of many other drug ad-
dicts who live in desolate social conditions, this might
be rare. The here presented compatibilist conception of
free will is strictly “internal” to an agent’s own desires,
which means it does not presuppose certain (objective)
values or does not require to assess a patient’s life-plans
(for the discussion of objective values in Frankfurt’s
account, see [42]. This means, most importantly, that
patients are not necessarily unfree if – as part of their
wish forming – they take into account an addiction or a
disease. It would be unjustified paternalistic to deny
DMC in such cases by default. Unfreedom would exist if
patients were under the acute influence of pain or fear
“forcing” them to refuse treatment or rehabilitation, even
though – as a second-level desire – they would like to
accept professional support.
Especially in the case of obvious manipulations we
seem to deny the freedom of the manipulated person. If,
like in the following thought experiment, our wishes
were caused by a malicious neurosurgeon, they do not
really seem to be our very own [43]. The question is
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whether we can be manipulated and still be free and re-
sponsible. In the case mentioned above, responsibility
seems suspicious to us because we suspect that there is
another self, the true self, which is now being deceived
by the malicious neurosurgeon. If this is indeed the case,
then the person is not free according to Frankfurt’s the-
ory, because the desire created by the malicious neuro-
surgeon is not an expression of the real self. However, if
there is no such betrayed self left, then the person is
free. This may be an astonishing, perhaps even frighten-
ing conclusion. But let us remember what it would mean
to be responsible for who we are. We should be able to
rise above all determinants and create ourselves. How-
ever, our education, to name just one example, is a
causal destiny of our self that we ourselves cannot really
influence, let alone control. Frankfurt’s theory does not
make freedom and responsibility dependent on whether
we are responsible for who we are. If any form of deter-
minism would be true, we wouldn’t be anybody. Frank-
furt states: “We are not fictitious characters, who have
sovereign authors; nor are we gods, who can be authors
of more than fiction. Therefore, we cannot be authors of
ourselves... We can be only what nature and life make
us, and that is not so readily up to us” ([44] p. 10).
The second objection we would like to discuss is com-
monly referred to as the regress problem. It states that—
given Frankfurt’s hierarchical approach of the will—we
never get out of the loop of reflection (in a third or even
higher order) and therefore cannot determine a certain de-
sire to be effective. Frankfurt objected that the first-order
desire could be approved by the second (reflective) stage
“without reservation” [39]. By identifying fully (whole-
hearted) with one’s own will, a higher-level, non-concluding
reflection would become pointless. In addition to Frank-
furt’s defense based on conceptual considerations, however,
we should above all consider the phenomenology of such
an impending over-reflective will. How would we assess a
person who never stops reflecting on his or her own will?
Insofar as this occurs at all, the case does not pose a par-
ticular problem because the person would obviously be in-
capable of making a decision. It should be noted that such
decisions may be rare and that losing oneself in circles of
reflection could become a case of (pathological) inability to
determine one’s own will. However, the reflection of desires
doesn’t entail perfect rationality, comprehensive knowledge
of circumstances, or even infallibility. What is required is a
certain overview of a person’s desires in the light of his or
her fundamental values and aims. And this is precisely what
a physician should consider when evaluating DMC and
what we will further explore in the next section.
According to the third objection, Frankfurt states in
his theory that many of the almost universally consid-
ered autonomous actions would turn out to be
non-autonomous if agents have never reflected upon
their desires [7]. This argument is based on the assump-
tion that the scope of the term autonomy should not be
revisionary (as would be assumed by incompatibilists),
but should rather remain descriptive, which means that
it is based on the (presumptive) commonly shared con-
cept of the possibility of autonomy (for the methodo-
logical background of descriptive and revisionary
approaches, see [45]. Beauchamp claims that “ordinary
choices qualify as autonomous even when persons have
not reflected on their preferences at a higher level and
even when they are hesitant to identify with one type of
desire rather than another.” ([7] p. 91). Does this mean
that Frankfurt demands too much reflection? Could it be
that we would never be able to meet these requirements
and that we would be completely taken over by our
habits without having a real “say”? Do our habits turn us
into wantons, i.e. in beings that are not self-directed,
that do not care which desire moves them to act? This is
only plausible under the assumption, that our habits are
entirely unreflected. This may be because the self does
not care about its own desires or because there is no
such self at all. However, taking reflection seriously does
not demand constant reflection of desires. What it
demands is rather a coherence of desires that could be
identified by reflection, when so engaged. Just as we
don’t deny somebody to know X if he doesn’t constantly
think of X, we cannot determine habits as outright unre-
flected. We don’t have to assume a single cognitive event
on which we finally decide. Contrary to criticism, the
theory rather requires reflection not to be overdone:
Persons who constantly and comprehensively reflect
upon their desires would risk of becoming incapable of
any decision or action through excessive reflection in
the sense of a compulsive disorder. After all, we must
not pose a false dichotomy: in everyday life, there is also
a considerable amount of actions which we cannot cat-
egorically call free or unfree. It makes no sense to say
that looking on the ground while walking or shaking
somebody’s hand are neither compelled (or instinctive)
nor fully free—even though—and this is crucial for us as
persons – we could start to reflect over doing such
things if we would like to.
The fourth objection is a critique of a different type
that has been recently expressed by Ahlin [46]. He criti-
cizes Frankfurt’s approach on the grounds that it is “im-
practical” as it fails according to Ahlin to “reliably
determine whether valid endorsement is actually taking
place when the desire-holder is in that state of mind. To
do so would require access to advanced (and currently
unavailable) neuro-imaging technology, in addition to an
in-depth knowledge of the psychological nature of
endorsement” [46]. In our opinion, this objection can be
easily rebutted: it does not make sense to conclude that
a person X does not expresses a reflective authentic
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desire because this cannot be proven by brain activities.
A sufficient indicator of authenticity would be to estab-
lish during a well led traditional physician-patient en-
counter that patient X adopts a reflective position. It
would be quite absurd to assume that a patient lacked
autonomy, because this could be read off the brain, even
though a conversation by the tricks in the book would
have turned out to be the opposite. This kind of “free-
dom” is reminiscent of Gilbert Ryle’s famous dictum of
the “ghost in the machine” - except that in the case of
the critique of Frankfurt’s model, the (allegedly) true free
ego is sought in the brain. But there is no additional type
of reflectiveness in the brain that a person would not be
aware of and that can only be accessed via brain imaging
or other types of technology showing brain activities.
Since all objections discussed above can be refuted, we
believe Frankfurt’s theory to be compelling, and we will
see in the following section how it helps us to under-
stand various types of compulsion better, and how it can
be integrated into the understanding of DMC.
Inner and outer constraints and the patient’s appreciation
The importance of the absence of constraints for DMC
has often been highlighted [12, 47, 48]. However,
whereas these contributions have focused on external
constraints, Frankfurt’s theory elucidates the relevance
of inner constraints. At first, “inner” and “outer” are just
metaphors. How could we make sense of it? Under nor-
mal circumstances, an outer constraint is an obstacle for
freedom of action. It makes it impossible to act as we
want like we have seen above in the prisoner-example.
However, the outer circumstances could very easily im-
pact the will. In the case of the prisoner, she could—after
a long time in prison—resign or even give up thoughts
about escaping the prison at all. This does not necessar-
ily mean unfree will, but perhaps rather a reasonable
adaption of the will to the present situation. We can
draw an analogy to a severe physical illness: For ex-
ample, a paraplegia considerably restricts a patient’s mo-
bility. Knowing that, the patient may give up his prior
wish to run a marathon. This change of mind may be
perfectly free, although in the same time regretted very
much. It demonstrates the patient’s appreciation of his
situation and the ability to identify with his own will in
view of the circumstances. But again, the causal history
is quite obvious: without the paraplegia, the patient
would have most likely kept up his wish. If, however, the
patient was overwhelmed by pain, if he was deeply
desperate and hopeless in a way that made it impossible
for him even to pay attention to the remaining options,
he would be unfree. It would be impossible for him to
consider his own desires in a sufficiently open manner.
In this case, the “outer” constraint would have led to an
“inner” one which destroys free will.
It is evident that the line cannot be easily drawn be-
tween a sufficiently reflected adjustment to circum-
stances – which is free – and a retreat or “breakdown”
of the will facing compulsory circumstances. Though, we
should not expect the theory to solve all the problems in
one fell swoop anyway, but to make it possible to de-
scribe and argue more accurately. We are familiar with
this distinction when we think of living organ donation.
In many cases, it is very difficult to judge for what rea-
son someone is donating, even for the donor herself. We
should not only concentrate on intended compulsion by
any other person (what would be the case if we follow
Beauchamp who determines compulsion as an
intentional act of someone else [7], but also carefully as-
sess the coherence of desires of the donor. It is decisive
whether anybody can “identify with her motivating de-
sires” or “if she is so alienated from them that she
regards the conditions necessary for identification as a
constraint on what she has reason to do.” ([49] p. 44).
Therefore, freedom of the will, and consequently appre-
ciation, is not so much a matter of influence by others,
but identification with the relevant desire. It is this need
to understand the full meaning of one’s own desire
which makes free will an aspect of the appreciation cri-
terion of DMC.
In summary, a will cannot be free when persons are
compelled or manipulated in their wishes and opinions
in a way that leads to a will that seems alien to her or
him. For a wish to be non-alien, a person must be able
to apply the information to his or her own situation,
which precisely means to appreciate. This, of course, re-
quires an ability to understand one’s own wishes and de-
mands, so to speak—as well as those of third-parties—
about what is at stake when deciding what to do, be-
cause there is no appreciation without understanding.
Attention to free will, according to the compatibilist
understanding defended in this paper, therefore helps to
fill gaps that might arise in the application of the clas-
sical criteria for DMC, because the embedding of a wish
into the higher-order desires—the desires that express
who we are and what we want to be—such as life plans
or overall goals, are not sufficiently taken into account.
In the last section, we turn to the question, how this
“embedment” could be examined more closely in a clin-
ical setting.
A sensitive evaluation of DMC: incorporating the relation
between desires
It is interesting to note that Frankfurt explains his theory
in terms of pathology. Let us briefly look at his rich
characterization of these phenomena. He describes the
threat to our freedom as “psychic analogues of the sei-
zures and spasmodic movements that occur at times in
our bodies” and as “things that happen to us” [38]. As
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persons, we experience that “some of the psychic raw
material that we confront may be so objectionable to us
that we cannot permit it to determine our attitudes or
our behavior.” ([38] p. 9). Freedom of the will then con-
sists in opposing these unwelcomed thoughts: “we deny
them [intruding thoughts] any entitlement to supply us
with motives or with reasons.” ([38] p. 10) and we are
defeated, when “the outlaw imposes itself upon us with-
out authority, and against our will.” [38].
Consider the example of a patient with a pathological
fear of general anesthesia as a specific phobia. This pa-
tient must undergo a specific surgical procedure involv-
ing general anesthesia in order to treat a certain disease.
The patient decides to refuse the surgical procedure be-
cause of his or her strong fear of general anesthesia. The
patient is completely aware of this strong fear being ir-
rational and one of the diagnostic criteria for the specific
phobia. Here, the action-governing first-order desire is
to refuse the surgical procedure because of the strong
fear of general anesthesia. However, the patient’s
second-order desire is not to have the first-order desire
because it is unreasonable. Therefore, the patient lacks
free will because he does not succeed in rendering the
first-order desire ineffective. The only way to clarify
whether the rejection of any surgical procedure is a dir-
ect consequence of the phobia is to consider the system
of desires, especially on the second-order level. On this
level, conflicts could easily be overlooked, if attention is
only paid to the obvious well-informed first-order desire,
which is, in consideration of the fear, perfectly rational.
It might be that the patient’s second-order desire con-
sists in not wanting anesthesia at all. However, it is likely
that the patient has another second-order desire to be in
good health and live well which could be explored in a
conversation about his core values. Therefore, if patients
want to have the will to foster their health condition
(and they know that and are able to express themselves),
then, in order to exhibit free will, this desire should
overrule other desires rising from the phobia that are
certainly impeding the attainment of these goals. Unless
the surgery is considered as unpromising or even point-
less, these patients should be supported in taking into
account the potential consequences of a treatment re-
fusal and to give their informed consent accordingly.
Furthermore, the acceptance of Frankfurt’s approach as
a guiding interpretation is convincing because it well cap-
tures approaches with different theoretical assumptions.
In the following, we show this by means of two clinical
case examples: Meynen introduces the (fictional) case of
Ms. X, a patient suffering from obsessive-compulsive dis-
order (OCD) [23], who strictly cleans her house for several
hours a day, while it would cause enormous distress for
her not to do so. Frankfurt’s analysis fits very well: On the
one hand, Ms. X wants things to go on as they are but still
suffers under the OCD. She experiences competing
first-order desires, and, as Meynen describes the case, she
also has the wish to refrain from OCD which is not off-
hand recognizable and why a second-order desire is con-
ceivable. Meynen portrays patients like Ms. X as feeling
“completely alienated from their behavior, not considering
it their behavior anymore” ([23] p. 327). The treatment
should be about the recognition of these higher-order de-
sires in light of what the patients fundamentally care
about. Accordingly, DMC depends on the ability to
recognize these specific desires.
In another intriguing contribution, Banner and
Szmukler investigated the meaning of objectivity in
evaluating DMC following ideas of Donald Davidson
[50]. The authors deal with cases in which patients ex-
press wishes which do not fit with their earlier state-
ments or which appear to be bizarre or unfounded to
others. Banner and Szmukler therefore call for consider-
ation of “the context in which such beliefs arise” and to
see how they connect with “other beliefs, values and be-
haviours” ([50] p. 358). Their presented cases show that
even very unusual, highly immoral, or repulsive wishes
can be freely willed, provided that they fit coherently
into the patient’s system of values and beliefs. These are,
however, precisely these cases in which the patient is
often denied DMC without good reason [50]. Such in-
ternal coherence of desires and traceability to more fun-
damental goals, values, or beliefs can be modeled very
well within the Frankfurtian framework.
The core concern seems to be that in evaluating
DMC, higher-order desires such as life plans, values, be-
liefs, or overall goals have to be felt out. However, the
most important and likewise simple question is which
desires patients want to have. Or in a wider sense, what
kind of person would they like to be and whether a cer-
tain desire can be interpreted as an expression of the
person’s self. As pointed out, this doesn’t demand
complete self-knowledge (which is beyond human cap-
acity). Thus, the evaluating physician shouldn’t only ask
what patients want with regard to their actions (first-or-
der desires) but also what someone wants to be his or
her will. Doing this, physicians have to be sensitive to
mental disorders that can impair the formation of wishes
and wills, even though a disease does not necessarily
exclude that a patient has a harmonious will, i.e. the
second-order desire concords with first-order desires,
and where he consents to a treatment. There has to be a
relevant degree of psychopathology to cause a truly
unharmonious will that goes beyond “normal”
functioning.
Conclusions
Even though free will is not an additional criterion for
DMC, the common understanding of the appreciation
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criterion shows gaps because certain types of lacking
free decision-making that are the consequence of a
non-harmonious will are not addressed clearly enough.
We have drawn attention to the importance of making
patients aware of and have them think about the ques-
tion as to whether their first-order will is something they
also wish on the second-order level because that is pre-
cisely what is needed to determine whether their will is
free. Following Frankfurt [38–41, 44], the insight is that
patients not only have wishes related to actions or con-
crete types of behavior, but also wishes that concern
other wishes some of which express essential qualities of
the person herself. If the physician who evaluates a pa-
tient’s DMC does not identify broad and unsolvable con-
flicts between the patient’s wishes related to actions and
those related to wishes, he can conclude on good
grounds that the patient’s will is free (harmonious), inde-
pendently of what the content of the will is.
This does not lead to additional difficulties or a higher
threshold for DMC and thus informed consent but is
important and useful to analyze more appropriately the
processes that lead to the forming of a will and to exam-
ine whether and why in acute situations patients may
have difficulties to form and express an authentic, i.e.
harmonious, will. With the at hand depicted compatibi-
list model, a sensitive evaluation of DMC is realizable in
clinical practice.
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